I find this saying quite applicable in this situation. It is hard for me to accept it as well. We cannot see it or touch it.
This is a view to which we will return. Most of this part of the dialogue is devoted to the idea that personal identity is a matter of some kind of psychological continuity; this is the view that we will focus on first.
This raises a problem in accounting for sameness of persons over time. After all, you are the same person that you were one year ago, but are not in exactly the same psychological states you were in then. This suggests that any account of personal identity in terms of psychological characteristics will have to have something to do with similarity over time.
This is the idea which is introduced by the comparison with the river pp. How foolish it would be, when we ask a question about the identity of baseball games, to look for something else, other than the game as a whole, which had to be the same.
The idea that just as rivers are river-stages connected by appropriate relations and baseball games are, e. What the appropriate relations are in the cases of rivers and baseball games.
The question of what the appropriate relations might be in the case of persons. To remember -- or, more plausibly, to be able to remember -- the thoughts and feelings of a person who was conscious in the past is just what it is to be that person.
For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances -- I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.
Why apparent memory is not enough for identity: We may suppose them to be sincere, and to really seem to remember it. But they do not actually remember because they were not at the battle and are not Napoleon.
What is the difference between real and apparent memories? The example of the hypnotist. Why this makes the memory theory of personal identity circular. A reply on the part of the memory theory of personal identity: The experiences themselves cause the later apparent memories in the one case, while the hypnotist causes them in the other.
We can say that the [real] rememberer is the one of the two whose memories were caused in the right way by the earlier experiences.
We thus distinguish between the rememberer and the hypnotic subject, without appeal to identity. A way to extend this version of the memory theory to make possible life after death.
The problem of duplicates: If God could create one person in Heaven, and by designing her after me, make her me, why could he not make two such bodies, and cause this transfer of information into both of them? Would both of these Heavenly persons then be me? But then they are not two but one. But my assumption was that God creates two, not one.
So either God, by creating a Heavenly person with a brain modeled after mind, does not really create someone identical with me but merely someone similar to me, or God is somehow limited to making only one such being. Why this reply does not get you very far.
This shows that this problem with the memory theory really has nothing to do with life after death. A second possible reply: Why this makes identity and survival extrinsic affairs; why this seems implausible.A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality (Hackett Philosophical Dialogues) [John Perry] on timberdesignmag.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.
Perry's excellent dialogue makes a complicated topic stimulating and accessible without any sacrifice of scholarly accuracy or timberdesignmag.com › Books › New, Used & Rental Textbooks › Humanities. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality (Hackett Philosophical Dialogues) by Perry, John and a great selection of similar Used, New and Collectible Books available now at timberdesignmag.com://timberdesignmag.com · Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 27, and is developed in Perry’s Dialogue.) (3) Animalism: you are the same person over time if and only if there is a continuity of your organism.
(Think of the identity of any animal or any organism. There is a problem of identity over time for that thing that needs to be solved. Do you want timberdesignmag.com~look/Personal timberdesignmag.com · In Perry’s Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality there is a conversation between three characters that lasted over a period of three nights.
The way the dialogue of the conversation was set up was that each night the topic of the argument will get more intense, tricky and timberdesignmag.com://timberdesignmag.com · (For more detail, see Reid’s ‘Of Mr. Locke’s Account of Our Personal Identity’ reprinted in Personal Identity, ed.
John Perry, ) The character view of personal identity is closely related to and often lumped with the memory view. On the character continuity theory, a person is identified as the totality of his or her character timberdesignmag.com://timberdesignmag.com /Whats_So_Simple_About_Personal_Identity.
· Perry – A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. The First Day: Weirob’s Challenge to Miller (p. ): Show me how it could even be so much as possible that I survive the death and destruction of my material timberdesignmag.com